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RETHINKING CORPORATE FIDUCIARY
DUTIES: THE INEFFICIENCY OF THE
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM
Gregory Scott Crespi*
I. INTRODUCTIONT owhom do corporate directors and officers owe their fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty? The conventional understanding
among modern courts and commentators is that such duties run
exclusively to the corporation's common shareholders,1 and that other
financial claimants of the corporation, such as its bondholders and pre-
ferred shareholders, are generally entitled only to enforcement of their
express contractual rights.2 When corporate directors and officers ("cor-
porate officials") make decisions within the remaining zone of discretion
whose boundaries are defined by these contractual provisions, they are
regarded as subject to a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth.
Bondholders and preferred shareholders can therefore look only to the
express terms of their contracts for protection of their interests since cor-
porate officials are under a legal mandate to maximize shareholder
wealth within those contractually-imposed limitations without regard for
the impact of their actions upon those other financial claimants.
From this perspective, what role do fiduciary duties serve in the corpo-
rate context? They are best viewed as judicially-imposed "gap-fillers"
that flesh out the details of the corporate officials' obligations created by
the contracts between the various corporate financial claimants and the
corporation. 3 These contracts are inevitably incomplete because of the
high transaction costs of fully specifying state-contingent agreements that
would cover all possible circumstances. Many situations arise where the
* Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Inter-
pretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 214 n.3 (1999). But see Margaret Blair
& Lynn Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 78
WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 403 (2001) (calling into question whether courts in fact generally accept
the shareholder primacy norm).
2. "United States corporate law generally assigns control to equity; debt then
bargains for specific contractual provisions to protect its interests. Similarly,
under normal circumstances, managers owe duties to shareholders but not to
bondholders." Frank Partnoy, Corporate Finance: Adding Dervatives to the
Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. REV. 599, 611 (2000).
3. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 90-93 (1991).
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proper choices to be made by corporate officials are not completely de-
termined by these contractual arrangements. There is an obvious need
for courts to impose some principle of accountability to guide those offi-
cials in their exercise of the often substantial discretion left to them by
their incomplete instructions, so to speak. The concept of an overriding
fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to some entity or some single class of cor-
porate claimants, such as common shareholders, provides a feasible stan-
dard for reviewing this exercise of discretion.
However, several different possible specifications of the locus of corpo-
rate officials' fiduciary duties may each be feasible in terms of the courts'
ability to monitor and enforce such duties. As noted above, current judi-
cial practice regards these fiduciary duties as running exclusively to the
common shareholders, and not to the bondholders or preferred share-
holders, or to the corporation as a whole.4 Does this principle create the
proper incentives for encouraging efficient resource allocation? Might it
be that defining the corporation as a whole as the subject of these fiduci-
ary duties would better promote economic efficiency? In this article, I
will address this question. 5
The framework of inquiry that I will utilize is a "hypothetical bargain"
approach. 6 Which specification of the person(s) to whom the fiduciary
duties of corporate officials run-the common shareholders or instead
the corporation as a whole-more closely conforms to the hypothetical
agreement that rational, wealth-maximizing bargainers in the positions of
the various corporate financial claimants would have agreed to at the
time the corporation was formed if the transaction costs of their negotia-
tions were low enough to permit them to fully specify their contractual
arrangements? Stated another way, which assignment of duties is more
efficient-more closely replicates the jointly wealth-maximizing structure
of rights and duties to which rational bargainers establishing a corpora-
tion would agree to in costless negotiations?
I will first conduct the hypothetical bargain inquiry under severely sim-
plifying assumptions concerning the complexity of corporate capital
structure and the degree of diversification of assets engaged in by the
corporate shareholders and bondholders at the time that their contracts
with the corporation are formed. I will then introduce more realistic as-
sumptions in order to assess the significance of the breadth of the invest-
ment options currently available in capital markets, the growing
complexity of corporate capital structures, and the insights of modern
portfolio choice theory for the efficiency of fiduciary duty assignments.
4. Smith, supra note 1, at 214 n.3.
5. This article will not address the issues presented by "constituency statutes" and the
related commentary concerning the advisability of extending the fiduciary duties of corpo-
rate officials beyond financial claimants to other corporate stakeholder groups such as cus-
tomers, suppliers, employees, etc. For an insightful discussion of these issues, and one that
also addresses tangentially the concerns addressed in this article, see Blair & Stout, supra
note 1.
6. Smith, supra note 1, at 216-17.
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My initial analysis of the comparative efficiency properties of the two
alternative fiduciary duty specifications, utilizing simplifying assumptions
about corporate capital structures and investor diversification, leads to
the conclusion that it would almost certainly be more efficient to regard
those duties as running to the corporation rather than to the common
shareholders. This result is even more strongly supported when one
starts from more realistic corporate capital structure and investor diversi-
fication premises. My ultimate conclusion is that economic efficiency
would be enhanced if the locus of corporate officials' fiduciary duties was
redefined as running to the corporation, both for larger corporations with
publicly-held securities and smaller corporations whose securities may be
more closely held, and I recommend that courts and legislatures take this
action.
My analysis builds directly upon a recent and important article by
Thomas Smith.7 The significance of this seminal article has not yet been
fully recognized by courts and corporate law scholars.8 My conclusions
strongly affirm his insights concerning the implications of the broad in-
vestment choices offered by modern capital markets and of the concep-
tions of investor behavior utilized by modern financial theorists for the
comparative efficiency of different fiduciary duty regimes. 9 In addition, I
have attempted to extend his work in several ways.
First, I have tried to show that his arguments do not rest solely upon his
strong assumptions as to the extent of investor diversification o or as to
7. Smith, supra note 1.
8. 1 am not aware of any court opinions citing to this article, though it has been cited
with approval in the legal journal literature in at least a couple of instances. See, e.g.,
Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary-Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your Cor-
porate Law Professor (Should Have) Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479
(2000) (citing Smith with approval at several points in support of various propositions);
Partnoy, supra note 2, at 616 (citing with approval Smith's point on the significance of the
complexity of corporate capital structures for efficient fiduciary duty assignments); Blair &
Stout, supra note 1, at 411 n.14 (citing Smith as an "outstanding work").
9. As Smith indicates:
The economic case for shareholder value maximization is, in fact, initially
puzzling and ultimately unconvincing. If economic efficiency is the norma-
tive guidepost for substantive law, the principle norm of corporate law can-
not be the maximization of shareholder value. . . . Rational corporate
investors in a hypothetical bargain setting would not agree to shareholder
value maximization as their gap-filling rule. ...
They would agree to a norm that told managers to maximize the value of the
diversified portfolios that CAPM says rational investors would hold .... A
fiduciary duty running to the corporation itself would be most consistent with
the gap-filling rule that emerges from hypothetical bargain analysis.
Smith, supra note 1, at 216-18.
10. Smith suggests that his call for redefinition of the fiduciary duties of corporate
officials is limited to corporations with publicly traded securities for which the assumption
of broad investor diversification seems most plausible:
For purposes of the neotraditional formulation of the corporate norm, how-
ever, corporations with publicly traded securities and closely held corpora-
tions should be clearly distinguished. This is because the logic of the
neotraditional formulation is driven by the choices of rational investors in
the capital markets ... treating part owners of close corporations, who are
more akin to partners in an enterprise, in the same way would not be justifia-
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the scope of the "vicinity of insolvency" problem that I will later discuss
in some detail. They are therefore even more compelling and of broader
applicability than he claims. Second, I have attempted to shed some light
upon the apparent reluctance of courts and scholars to embrace the posi-
tion that both he and I advocate.
I have not addressed in this article any of the potentially important
secondary issues that would be raised should the courts follow my recom-
mendations and redefine the locus of the fiduciary duties of corporate
officials as the corporation itself rather than its common shareholders.11 I
leave this analysis of transitional difficulties, implementation approaches,
and the like to others more qualified to conduct it. I will, however, con-
clude this article by offering my speculations as to why the courts have
thus far failed to redefine the locus of fiduciary duties in the manner I
recommend, and these speculations do touch briefly upon matters of
transition costs and implementation.
II. THE SIMPLE CASE
For the sake of simplicity and clarity let me begin the analysis by con-
sidering a hypothetical negotiation among prospective corporate inves-
tors who wish to establish a corporation with a very simple capital
structure: a single class of common stock equity, and simple non-converti-
ble bond debt. Let me also assume that the prospective shareholders and
bondholders of the firm are and intend to remain two entirely separate
groups of investors, i.e., each intends to remain undiversified across eq-
uity and debt claims against this particular corporation.12 Each group of
prospective investors will therefore seek to have corporate officials act to
maximize the value of their particular claims against the corporation,
rather than the value of the combined claims of all classes of investors,
i.e., the value of the corporation as a whole.
What framework of agreement would these persons reach regarding
the duties of corporate officials if transaction costs were sufficiently low
to allow negotiating a fully state-contingent set of contracts? Stated an-
other way, what is the hypothetical wealth-maximizing bargain result that
ble .... [Thus,] the conclusions that follow from the diversifications of ra-
tional CAPM investors do not apply directly to the close corporation context.
Id. at 257. I have attempted to demonstrate in this article, however, that the arguments for
redefinition of fiduciary duties are even broader than Smith recognizes and do not require
strong assumptions about the extent of investor diversification.
11. For example, a question would be presented concerning how non-shareholder
claimants could enforce this duty. Would they be granted standing to bring derivative ac-
tions against the offending officials in the name of the corporation, as are common share-
holders under current law?
12. The argument is not affected by whether these investors otherwise act as rational,
risk-averse investors in accordance with modern financial theories of optimal portfolio
choice, and thereby diversify their investment portfolios sufficiently in other ways so as to
avoid the burden of unsystematic risk associated with their investment in the securities of
the subject corporation.
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the legal incentives and disincentives should be designed to facilitate in
order to maximize efficiency?
First, it is clear that those persons would agree to restrict, in some fash-
ion, the choice of firm investments to those that have a positive value for
the investors viewed as a whole-investments whose combined effect on
the market value of the firm's equity and debt would be positive. Invest-
ments with negative overall consequences for the investors would be pro-
hibited; not only those investments that would hurt both classes of
claimants, but also those investments that would increase the market
value of the common shares but reduce the market value of the firm's
debt by a greater amount, and those investments that would increase the
value of the debt but reduce the value of the equity by a greater amount.
The reason for this result would not be the solicitude of either group
for the interests of the other group. The reason instead would be that the
parties would recognize that it maximizes their joint wealth. Because one
group of investors would by definition lose more from those investments
that do not increase overall corporate value than the other group would
gain, in a rational bargaining context both groups would recognize that
each would gain if at the outset the prospective losers from such invest-
ments agreed to make the side payments or other concessions necessary
to fully compensate the prospective gainers, in exchange for those other
persons agreeing to contractual provisions requiring corporate officials to
forgo such investment opportunities. 13
Under the assumption that transaction costs are low enough to permit
the parties to fully specify their agreement, there would be no remaining
zone of discretion left to corporate officials by the contractual arrange-
ments that would require the imposition of any fiduciary duties for gui-
dance. The result of this hypothetical bargain would be a complex and
complete set of contractual restrictions and side payment arrangements
which permitted corporate officials to select among only those investment
opportunities that increased the combined wealth of the shareholders and
bondholders and prohibited those officials from pursuing any other in-
vestment choices. Stated more simply, corporate officials would be di-
rected to choose among only those opportunities that at a minimum
increased the value of the corporation.
13. Among the set of investment choices that have positive consequences for overall
investor wealth, the shareholders would also seek to prohibit those investments within this
set that reduced shareholder wealth, unless adequate compensatory side payment arrange-
ments were agreed to ex ante by the benefiting bondholders, and the bondholders would
similarly oppose those investment projects that increased overall investor worth but re-
duced bondholder wealth, absent sufficient shareholder ex ante side payments. Since by
definition in this hypothetical situation the shareholders and bondholders are entirely dis-
tinct groups, and these would therefore be zero-sum disputes, all that we can be sure of in
the abstract is that rational parties would agree to ex ante side payments at least sufficient
to compensate the group of persons who would lose from a mutually wealth-enhancing
investment option. Beyond this, the precise determination of the gain-sharing arrange-
ments would depend on the relative bargaining power of the parties. The key point is that
rational parties would reach contractual arrangements adequate to allow corporate offi-
cials to pursue those projects.
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How closely does the current legal framework that requires corporate
officials to regard common shareholders as the sole recipient of their fi-
duciary duties replicate such a hypothetical investor agreement reached
under these simplifying assumptions? Not very well at all! For any in-
vestment possibilities falling within the zone of discretion left to particu-
lar corporate officials by the incompleteness of the applicable
shareholder and bondholder contracts, the fiduciary duties currently im-
posed require those officials to pursue projects that increase shareholder
wealth, even if they are not wealth-enhancing for the corporation as a
whole, i.e., will reduce bondholder wealth by more than they increase
shareholder wealth. 14 Such investment projects do exist. For example, as
Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Court of Chancery made clear in 1991
in his now-famous "vicinity of insolvency" footnote 55 in Credit Lyonnais
Bank v. MGM-Pathe Communications,'5 risky investments made by a
corporation that is in the "vicinity of insolvency" may well have adverse
consequences for the wealth of the corporation, given the distribution
and magnitude of the possible outcomes, but nevertheless may have posi-
tive consequences for the wealth of the common shareholders., 6 The
shareholders will receive virtually all of the upside gains should such an
investment prove successful,'17 yet because of their limited capital at risk
when the firm is in the "vicinity of insolvency," the corporation's bond-
holders will bear much of the downside risk of unsuccessful results. 18
Moreover, given the availability in modern capital markets of opportuni-
ties for investors to take very large gambles on low-probability events,
even large, well-capitalized firms are in the "vicinity of insolvency" with
regard to at least some of their investment choices. 19
14. They also require those officials to forego opportunities that would increase the
value of the corporation but reduce the value of the common shares.
15. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No.
CIV.A.12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). A number of courts in
Delaware and elsewhere have cited this opinion for its vicinity of insolvency discussion.
See, e.g., Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns. Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992); In re Buckhead
Am. Corp., 178 B.R. 956 (D. Del. 1994); Equity-Linked Investors v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040
(Del. Ch. 1997); Odyssey Partners v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch. 1999); Lasalle
Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279 (D. Del. 2000); In re Mortgage & Realty Trust,
195 B.R. 740 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); In re Schulz, 208 B.R. 723 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997);
Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc. v. Kendig, No. 97C7934, No. 976043, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 276, at *1 (N.D. I11. Jan. 11, 2000); Management Techs., Inc. v. Morris, 961 F. Supp.
2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Askanase v. Fatjo, CIV.A. H-91-3140, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7911,
at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 1993); Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
16. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55.
17. There may also be some small benefits to the bondholders of a successful invest-
ment result because the resulting growth in the firm's equity cushion will reduce their in-
solvency risk with regard to future investments.
18. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613 at *34 n.55. See also Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduci-
ary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 ("[l]f the management of a financially distressed company en-
gages in extraordinarily risky activities, the upside gain accrues to shareholders while the
creditors bear the downside risk.").
19. Smith, supra note 1, at 223-24.
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In addition, a closely related point not explicitly recognized by Chan-
cellor Allen in his Credit Lyonnais footnote is that even some investments
outside of the "vicinity of insolvency"-investments that do not pose any
insolvency risk even if the worst possible outcome results-can also result
in expected shareholder wealth effects that diverge from expected corpo-
ration wealth effects. For example, an investment with widely diverging
possible outcomes and no insolvency risk associated with any of the possi-
ble outcomes could potentially have positive consequences for sharehold-
ers if its expected returns are attractive, but the bondholders might value
the possible diminution of the firm's equity cushion against insolvency
risk with regard to future operations of the corporation that would result
from poor investment performance as more substantial and adverse than
their benefit from the enhancement of the equity cushion that would be
realized from successful investment performance.
20
The current regime of fiduciary duties running exclusively to common
shareholders now imposes upon bondholders the need to protect them-
selves with express contractual terms against the prospect of the corpora-
tion pursuing investments that would increase shareholder wealth but
reduce bondholder wealth. The widespread use of such protective cove-
nants should definitely not be regarded as prima facie evidence of their
efficiency as a means of protecting bondholder interests. This is because
under current law bondholders do not have the option of redefining con-
tractually the locus of the fiduciary duty of corporate officials to them-
selves or to the corporation.2 1 Their only remaining choice is to include
protective covenants in their bond indenture designed to preclude share-
holder-loyal officials from pursuing such investments, along with de-
manding a rate of return sufficient to compensate them for the residual
risk that some investment options may later appear that are not pre-
cluded by the protective covenants. This practice therefore does not nec-
essarily indicate that such provisions are less costly to negotiate than
20. My point here is that there might well be a "diminishing marginal security from the
equity cushion" effect at work for bondholders; an effect which is precisely analogous to
the impact of the principle of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth which gives rise to
the widespread phenomena of risk aversion with regard to fair or even slightly favorable
gambles. Such "diminishing marginal security" could lead bondholders-for at least some
investments that both promise expected gains to shareholders and are outside of the "vi-
cinity of insolvency," thus posing no insolvency risk-to value the possibilities of loss of
some of their equity cushion against future insolvency risks that might result from an in-
vestment as more harmful than would be the offsetting benefit resulting from the possibili-
ties of a gain in the size of that equity cushion.
21. Such a contractual provision would most likely be deemed unenforceable:
In practice, bondholders cannot contract into fiduciary or similar protection
as a gap-filling rule that is superior to what shareholders get, whether or not
they wanted to do so .... As interpreted by modern courts and academic
commentators, such a provision would violate managers' fiduciary duty to
shareholders.... [Als long as the governing rule is that shareholders benefit
exclusively from a fiduciary duty and bondholders can get only express con-
tractual protections, a contract term purporting to provide bondholders with
something like gap-filling fiduciary protection would be unenforceable.
Smith, supra note 1, at 251.
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would be a simple redefinition of the locus of residual fiduciary duties.
To the contrary, these protective measures seem obviously inefficient
compared to the more direct alternative of contractually imposing a fidu-
ciary duty running to the corporation that would displace the judicially-
imposed duty of shareholder loyalty. The latter approach would likely
become the means of choice where such a contractual provision is to be
regarded as creating an enforceable obligation.22
This legal framework should be contrasted with the framework that
would likely develop if courts redefined the fiduciary duty of corporate
officials as running to the corporation as a whole, rather than to the com-
mon shareholders. Such a duty would preclude corporate pursuit of "vi-
cinity of insolvency" projects that would have positive impacts on
shareholder wealth but negative impacts on overall corporate wealth,
thereby obviating the need for bondholders to negotiate protective cove-
nants to accomplish this same end.23 Such a regime would markedly
lessen the burden now imposed upon prospective investors to devise pro-
tective covenants precluding such investments under an incredibly broad
range of circumstances difficult or impossible to anticipate in detail.
In brief summary, at least in theory the prospective investors could
under either regime of fiduciary duty specification replicate the efficient
hypothetical bargain outcome-restricting corporate officials to pursuing
only those investments that increase the value of the corporation-by ne-
gotiating protective covenants that would effectively limit those officials
in that manner. However, the transaction cost of doing so would likely be
smaller under a legal regime that directly imposed upon corporate offi-
cials, as the default rule, the fiduciary duty to maximize the corporation's
value than it would be under the current regime that imposes a different
default rule-common shareholder wealth maximization-that must then
be comprehensively countered by the bondholders with an elaborate
structure of protective covenants.2 4 In more general terms, the current
legal regime requires the parties to the corporate nexus of contracts to
contract around an inefficient default rule. It would be more efficient for
the courts to promulgate a default rule that created the same incentives
for corporate officials as would result from the hypothetical zero transac-
tion cost bargain the parties would have reached. This would spare the
parties the burdensome task of devising elaborate contractual restrictions
22. Id.
23. It would also preclude pursuit of those projects discussed above in the text corre-
sponding to note 20 that do not present insolvency risks but that have positive impacts on
expected shareholder wealth and negative expected impacts on overall corporate wealth.
24. Laura Lin, in her 1993 article, favors as I do requiring corporate officials to maxi-
mize firm wealth, but takes a different position than I do on the relative efficiency of
achieving this goal through imposing a fiduciary duty to that end versus requiring the
bondholders to rein in the traditional shareholder wealth-maximization duty through pro-
tective covenants: "Directors should maximize the value of the firm regardless of its finan-
cial status, and the optimal means of reaching this goal is to require creditors to bargain for
this duty [while retaining the shareholder wealth-maximization norm]." Lin, supra note 18,
at 1510.
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to rein in the inefficient incentive created by the fiduciary duty to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth.
I therefore conclude that at least under the very restrictive capital
structure and investor diversification assumptions of this simple hypo-
thetical, a plain vanilla common stock/bond capital structure and inves-
tors that are completely undiversified across the stocks and bonds of the
corporation,25 economic efficiency would be enhanced by shifting the lo-
cus of corporate officials' fiduciary duties from the common shareholders
to the corporation as a whole.
III. MORE REALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
How robust is this conclusion with regard to more complex and realis-
tic assumptions about corporate capital structures and the degree of in-
vestor diversification? If it is assumed that the subject corporation to be
established through a hypothetical bargain is to have a more complicated
capital structure that also involves one or more classes of preferred stock,
and perhaps also different classes of common stock, and that its investors
abide by the principles of modern portfolio theory and therefore hold
fully diversified "market portfolios" of assets,26 how do these changes in
the underlying assumptions affect the conclusions reached above for the
simple case as to the comparative efficiency of the two different fiduciary
duty specifications being here considered? As will be shown below, in-
troduction of those more realistic assumptions simply serves to further
strengthen the conclusion that efficiency would be enhanced by redefin-
ing the locus of corporate officials' fiduciary duties to the corporation.
A. COMPLEX CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURES
A more complex capital structure with different classes of preferred
and common stock creates severe difficulties for corporate officials who
seek to implement the current broad "maximize shareholder wealth" fi-
duciary duty directive. If there are several different classes of "share-
holders," their interests may upon occasion be in conflict. Whose
interests should take precedence in those situations?
I am not aware of any judicial opinions dealing directly with this inter-
esting question. The resoaition that would be most consistent with cur-
rent law would be that corporate officials should regard their fiduciary
duties as running to the firm's most residual claimants: those equity hold-
ers that are entitled to the remaining revenues once all the rights of
higher-priority claimants have been met. This resolution would parallel
the imposition of shareholder wealth maximization as the default fiduci-
25. Although it is not necessary to assume that these investors are not otherwise fully
diversified. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. Such "market portfolios" are portfolios diversified across the different stock and
bond securities of the subject corporation in proportion to their relative aggregate values,
as well as similarly diversified between those securities and all other assets, and differ
among investors only in their size and extent of leverage with borrowed funds.
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ary duty for the simple stock/bond corporation-the common sharehold-
ers there being the firm's residual claimants-and the choice of any of the
intermediate-priority stockholders or bond claimants rather than the
residual claimants as the locus of corporate official fiduciary duties in a
corporation with a complex capital structure would not be at all consis-
tent with that basic principle.27
This particular resolution of the conflict of interest problem would
lead, however, to other major problems that call into question the origi-
nal premise. It is well understood that common shares in a corporation
with bond debt are in an analogous position with regard to their incen-
tives to engage in risky investments as are the holders of call options on
an asset, with the amount of bond debt being the equivalent of the option
exercise price.28 This observation alludes back to the "vicinity of insol-
vency" problem noted by Chancellor Allen.2 9 In a complex, multi-level
equity capital structure, the most residual claims are equivalent to barely
in-the-money call options (or even out-of-the-money call options if the
total revenues that prior claimants are entitled to exceed the expected net
revenues of the firm!). Imposing a fiduciary duty upon corporate officials
to maximize the wealth of such thinly capitalized residual claimants
presents the "vicinity of insolvency" problem in particularly stark fashion,
as these claimants have little to lose and much to gain from highly risky
investments, and would often favor even those investment options with
negative overall expected values that could significantly reduce overall
corporation value.
Recognition of the complexity of modern corporate capital structures
therefore emphasizes the problem that the bondholders of such corpora-
tions, as well as the holders of all of the other classes of preferred stock
and higher-priority "common" stock, are presented with by judicially-im-
posed fiduciary duties on behalf of the most residual claimants. 30 Com-
plex capital structures magnify considerably the difficulties involved in
negotiating the comprehensive contractual restrictions needed to ensure
that only those investments that increase overall corporation value are
undertaken. More different classes of parties with conflicting interests
have to reach agreement, and the costs to those parties of leaving any
gaps in the nexus of contracts are now larger because of the risk-loving
nature of the residual claimants to whom the corporate officials' fiduciary
duties run. As corporate capital structures become more complex, the
increased comparative efficiency advantage of the "maximize corporation
value" fiduciary duty principle becomes apparent when one considers
both the enhanced necessity and the increased difficulty of achieving this
27. Smith, supra note 1, at 261-63.
28. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF Fi-
NANCE AND INVESTMENT 234-35 (1993).
29. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55.
30. For an extended discussion of this problem, see Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial
Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Wel-
fare, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1273 (1991). See also Partnoy, supra note 2.
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result contractually by contracting around an economically perverse
"maximize shareholder value" default rule.
B. FULLY DIVERSIFIED INVESTORS
Let me now consider how the hypothetical corporation-forming negoti-
ations among prospective investors seeking to establish a corporation
with a complex capital structure will play out if all of those investors hold
and intend to continue to hold fully diversified "market portfolios" in
accordance with the recommendations of modern portfolio theory. 31
Such investors would each agree to purchase a diversified portfolio of all
classes of debt and equity to be issued by the new corporation, blended in
proportion to the relative aggregate values of those classes of securities.
In other words, they would all elect to own the same fully diversified
"vertical slice" of the different classes of the debt and equity claims
against the corporation, and their overall positions would differ only in
their size and extent to which they were leveraged with borrowed funds.
These negotiations would obviously proceed rather smoothly since all
parties would have essentially identical interests and concerns.
No party to the negotiations would argue for the imposition of fiduci-
ary duties on corporate officials to maximize the value of the most
residual class of securities-or, for that matter, of any single class of se-
curities-rather than the corporation's value as a whole, since the value
of each investor's portfolio of securities in the corporation will precisely
track movements in overall firm value. Obviously no investor would
favor the imposition of an economically perverse fiduciary duty that
would then require all of them to comprehensively counter that duty
through protective covenants. They would instead implement the princi-
ple of fiduciary obligations running to the corporation itself. Moreover,
given the congruence of investor interests, this principle could be articu-
lated simply and directly, rather than indirectly implemented as the resul-
tant of a complex set of restrictions and side payment arrangements
which would be necessary in the simple hypothetical negotiations dis-
cussed earlier where the interests of prospective shareholders and bond-
holders conflict in some significant regards.
How do the two alternative fiduciary specifications compare with re-
spect to how closely they would replicate the terms of this hypothetical
bargain? The answer is obvious: the difference in efficiency is dramatic
and in favor of having the fiduciary duties run to the corporation. Having
the locus of fiduciary duties run to the corporation itself precisely tracks
the result of hypothetical negotiations among fully diversified investors,
and would therefore spare such investors almost completely of the need
to impose contractual limitations on management discretion. On the
other hand, imposing a fiduciary duty on corporate officials to maximize
the value of the firm's most residual claims without regard to the impact
31. See supra note 26.
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on the value of the corporation as a whole goes against the interests of
not just some but all of the firm's investors, requiring them to negotiate
comprehensive contractual limitations to minimize the scope of discretion
to which that economically perverse default duty would apply.
In summary, the introduction of more realistic assumptions as to the
complexity of corporate capital structures and the diversification of inves-
tors highlights dramatically the economic inefficiency of the current fidu-
ciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth and emphasizes the
advantages of respecifying these fiduciary duties as running to the corpo-
ration as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. THE ARGUMENTS APPLY TO ALL CORPORATIONS
The arguments considered here are broad enough to justify redefining
the locus of corporate officials' fiduciary duties for all types of corpora-
tions, be they large, publicly traded firms or instead small, closely-held
companies. The case is most compelling for larger corporations with
complex capital structures and whose investors are broadly diversified,
but as I have demonstrated the argument also holds true for more simple
corporations with investors who are completely undiversified across the
firm's securities. 32
Let me elaborate on these claims. As discussed above, for those corpo-
rations where the corporate investors are fully diversified across the cor-
poration's different classes of securities, it is absolutely clear that
maximization of the value of the corporation is more in accord with in-
vestor preferences than is maximization of the value of the most residual
claims, and that there would be real transaction costs savings from the
change that I recommend. Such broad investor diversification is likely to
be the case, at least to a reasonable first approximation, for large corpo-
rations whose securities are publicly traded or privately placed with the
larger institutional investors who serve as the diversification vehicles for
their investor clients.
However, as previously discussed, the efficiency argument for redefin-
ing the locus of fiduciary duties of a corporation is bolstered by but does
not require that its investors are diversified across the different classes of
financial claims against the corporation. For small, closely-held corpora-
tions at the other end of the spectrum-where the shareholders and
bondholders may be two entirely separate groups of investors-conflicts
will still exist over the desirability of risky "vicinity of insolvency"-type
investments. Under zero transaction cost circumstances, the anticipation
of such conflicts would, as discussed above, lead to ex ante agreements
among the investors to limit firm investments to those enhancing overall
corporate value. Therefore, even under the circumstances of small,
32. This conclusion is one area where I differ from the conclusions reached by Thomas
Smith in his earlier work. See supra note 10.
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closely-held companies with undiversified investors, a fiduciary duty to
that effect would be more efficient than is the current fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder value, which requires elaborate protective cove-
nants to circumvent.
The law should accordingly be changed across the board for all corpo-
rations. The sweeping nature of this recommendation yields an addi-
tional advantage. Its adoption will therefore not result in any difficult
definitional line-drawing problems for corporate officials and courts com-
parable to those that were identified by the commentators assessing the
merits of the Credit Lyonnais "vicinity of insolvency" exception. 33
B. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE CHANGE
Given the rather straightforward and compelling economic efficiency
arguments for respecifying the fiduciary duties of corporate officials to
run to the corporation as a whole rather than to its shareholders, one
wonders why this change in the law has not yet occurred. What is the
impediment here that has prevented courts (and legislatures) from taking
decisive action? One can only speculate on the reasons for inaction, but I
have a few preliminary thoughts on this question.
A review of the judicial and scholarly reaction to the Credit Lyonnais
"vicinity of insolvency" footnote suggests one explanation. The discus-
sion by Chancellor Allen, as previously noted, suggested that when a firm
is in the "vicinity of insolvency" the locus of corporate officials' fiduciary
obligations should be broadened to include bondholders as well as share-
holders, and perhaps even the corporation as a whole.34 The response by
the scholarly commentators to his initiative has been lukewarm at best,
33. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 18, at 1512 (describing the vicinity of insolvency exception
as "ill-defined."); C. Robert Morris, Directors' Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A
Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 61, 67-68 (1993) (Under the vicinity of
insolvency exception "it is difficult to find a principled stopping place ... [and] to impose
just solutions to this problem."); Rima Fawal Hartman, Situation-Specific Fiduciary Duties
for Corporate Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1761, 1766 (1993) (the Credit Lyonnais vicinity of insolvency exception is of uncertain
scope); Stephen R. McDonnell, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: Insolvency Shifts Di-
rectors' Burden From Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177, 178 (1994)
(describing the vicinity of insolvency exception as ambiguous as to timing and standard of
review); Brent Nicholson, Recent Delaware Case Law Regarding Director's Duties to Bond-
holders, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 573, 575 (1994) (criticizing the vicinity of insolvency exception
as "regrettably ambiguous in its timing and scope."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a
Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 672 (1996) (noting the
valuation difficulties, the cost of implementation, and the sensitivity to the assumptions
made of the vicinity of insolvency exception); Ramesh K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la
Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed
Firm, 22 IOWA J. CORP. L. 53, 62-64 (1996) (criticizing the vicinity of insolvency exception
as overly broad and ambiguous); Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and
Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 72 (1998) (criticizing the
vicinity of insolvency exception as ambiguous); Christopher L. Barnett, Healthco and the
"Insolvency Exception": An Unnecessary Expansion of the Doctrine?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J.
441, 465 (2000) (describing the vicinity of insolvency exception as a "fuzzy concept.");
Shaffer, supra note 8, at 512-20 (noting the complexities of defining corporate insolvency).
34. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55.
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with much of the criticism focusing on the difficulties corporate officials
would have in defining "insolvency" and in then determining when the
corporation was in the "vicinity" of such a condition. 35 The judicial re-
sponse has also been mixed. Some courts have endorsed the Credit Lyon-
nais "vicinity of insolvency" exception, although none have extended its
application beyond near-insolvency circumstances. 36 Other courts have
been less enthusiastic. The subsequent Delaware case of Geyer v. Inger-
soll Publications, Co. 37 arguably limited the Credit Lyonnais exception to
situations where the corporation was actually insolvent rather than
merely in the "vicinity of insolvency, ' 38 and a number of courts have fol-
lowed this restrictive interpretation of the Geyer ruling.39
The muted character of the response to Chancellor Allen's proposal
highlights the inherent conservatism and incrementalism of the legal sys-
tem, which often, but not always, serves us well. He articulated the new
"vicinity of insolvency" concept in traditional fashion as an exception of
limited scope to the enduring principle of a fiduciary duty of shareholder
wealth-maximization, rather than as I have done here as one of several
concerns together supporting a wholesale repudiation of that principle.
In the same gradualist spirit as shown by the Chancellor, the courts and
commentators have concerned themselves with the narrower problems of
defining the scope of and implementing such an exception and have, for
good reasons, found them to be daunting.40 While I am convinced that
imposing fiduciary duties in favor of shareholders is less efficient than
imposing them in favor of the corporation as a whole, I concede that it
35. See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Does a Corporation's Board of Directors Owe
a Fiduciary Duty to Its Creditors?, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 589 (1994) (arguing there is no case
law support for the vicinity of insolvency exception). See also the writers cited supra note
33, who each express concerns about the feasibility of imposing workable limits on this
exception.
36. See, e.g., In re Buckhead, 178 B.R. at 968; Equity-Linked Investors, 705 A.2d at
1042 n.2; In re Schultz, 208 B.R. at 729; Ben Franklin Retail Stores, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
at *11-13; Management Technologies, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 645; Askanase, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at *12-14; Weaver, 216 B.R. at 582-84.
37. 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
38. The Geyer opinion specifically held that the Credit Lyonnais vicinity of insolvency
exception can "arise at the moment of insolvency in fact rather than waiting for the institu-
tion of statutory [insolvency] proceedings." Id. at 789. The difficult question is whether
this ruling should be regarded as limiting the scope of that exception to instances of insol-
vency in fact, rather than applying also to near-insolvency situations, or as merely declaring
that the exception does not require the commencement of statutory insolvency proceed-
ings. As noted infra note 39, a number of courts have read Geyer as limiting the scope of
the exception. For an opinion arguing strongly to the contrary, see Weaver, 216 B.R. at 583
n.30:
[The Geyer] court made this statement in the context of its decision that in
order for a plaintiff to invoke the insolvency exception, it is not necessary for
the corporation to have actually declared bankruptcy. In this statement, the
court was merely rejecting one narrow interpretation of insolvency; it was
not limiting its earlier description [in Credit Lyonnais] ...of the circum-
stances in which directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors.
39. See, e.g., Odyssey Partners, 735 A.2d at 417; Lasalle Nat'l Bank, 82 F. Supp. 2d at
290; In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 195 B.R. at 750-51; In re Healthco, 208 B.R. at 300-01;
In re Zale, 196 B.R. at 354-55.
40. See supra note 33.
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may well be that attempting to fine tune the current fiduciary duty regime
with an inherently imprecise insolvency-based exception is unworkable.
In more general systems theory terms, it may be that the current fiduciary
duty regime is a local but not a global optimum that is more efficient than
the closely neighboring possibilities, even if it is, as I claim, far inferior to
a more radical alternative. A legal system limited to making only incre-
mental improvements may well remain indefinitely at a local optimum
that is globally suboptimal.
A second possible reason for judicial reluctance to make the change
that I recommend could be the perception that even if the new regime
would have on balance significant efficiency advantages, the transition
costs of such a major change-which would include among other ele-
ments the efforts required by numerous corporate officials to understand
and implement their new duties, and the need for courts and legislatures
to develop procedural mechanisms, such as expanded derivative suit fil-
ing rights, etc., whereby bondholders, preferred shareholders, and other
non-residual equity claimants could effectively enforce the new fiduciary
duty scheme-might outweigh those benefits. As noted earlier, the eval-
uation of such transition cost or procedurally-based objections would re-
quire a separate and extensive analysis.
One final impediment may be that some judges who are only slightly
familiar with this controversy might misunderstand the motivations of the
persons calling for change. It was really not until well into the 20th cen-
tury that lawyers and judges began to accept that the fiduciary duties of
corporate officials ran to the common shareholders rather than to the
corporation itself.41 Before that time, most persons saw the fiduciary du-
ties as running to the, corporation. However, they did not have modern
capital markets or modern financial theory in mind, but were instead op-
erating with a conception of the essential nature of corporate personhood
which would strike most modern observers as an excessive and quaint
"reification" of a mere legal fiction.42
Some judges today may therefore regard the calls to redirect corporate
officials' fiduciary duties to the corporation as a whole as merely the lin-
gering echoes of these early 20th-century views. I trust that the reader of
this article recognizes that the arguments I am offering do not merely
reflect a nostalgic yearning for the resurrection of discarded conceptions
of the nature of corporate personhood, but are based upon a rational
choice theory assessment of the consequences of the current availability
of large and highly risky investment options through capital markets, the
complexity of modern corporate capital structures, and the implications
41. Smith, supra note 1, at 243. See also Shaffer, supra note 8, at 492 ("Until the 1930's
it was generally thought that the exclusive beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship was the
corporation alone.").
42. The Oxford English Dictionary defines reification as "[t]he mental conversion of a
person or abstract concept into a thing." 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 532 (2d
ed. 1989). For discussion of early 20th century concepts of corporate personhood, see
Smith, supra note 1, at 244-45 nn.72, 73.
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of modern financial theories of optimal portfolio choice. I hope that the
courts and legislatures will eventually come to the same realization and
act accordingly.
